Ostrom, E (2010) Analyzing collective action. Agricultural Economics, 41 (s1). pp. 155-166.
![[img]](http://eprints.icrisat.ac.in/style/images/fileicons/application_pdf.png) |
PDF
- Published Version
Restricted to ICRISAT researchers only Request a copy |
Abstract
Collective-action problems pervade all societies as well as ecological systems used by humans. Substantial evidence has accrued during the last several decades that human actors are able to solve some (but definitely not all) collective-action problems on their own without external rules and enforcement imposed from the outside. In this article, I review some of the structural variables that have been found to affect the likelihood of collective action. Then, I address the need to base future work on collective action on a more general theory of human behavior than has been used to model collective action over the last five decades. In the last section, I discuss how structural variables affect the core relationships of reputation, trust, and reciprocity as these affect levels of cooperation.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | Collective action; Behavioral theory of human action; Context; Trust |
| Author Affiliation: | Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN, USA, and Center for the Study of Institutional Diversity, Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ, USA. |
| Subjects: | Social Sciences > Agricultural Economics |
| Divisions: | General |
| Depositing User: | Mr Siva Shankar |
| Date Deposited: | 03 Jan 2013 10:01 |
| Last Modified: | 03 Jan 2013 10:01 |
| Official URL: | http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1574-0862.2010.00497.x |
| URI: | http://eprints.icrisat.ac.in/id/eprint/9289 |
Actions (login required)
 |
View Item |
